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STATEMENT OF CASE
This litigation has all arisen from a. contract for the
sale and purchase of real estate, dated January 24, 1942, between the Western Reserve Underwriters Corporation, as
seller, and plaintiffs, J. Lloyd Mathis and Nellie M. Burtenshaw Mathis and C. E. Kingston, as trustee in trust for Davis
County Cooperative Society. By the terms of the supplement
to the Contract, (Exhibit A) the seller agreed to convey the
property-four-fifths to Mathis and wife and one-fifth to C. E.
Kingston as trustee. The purchase price of the property was
paid and no controversy arose directly in connection with the
purchase. When the full sum of the purchase price was paid,
the seller was advised of a controversy and held up the deed.
Immediately upon the execution of the contract, the purchasers went into possession of the property. A memorandum
of agreement for the operations on the farm was made as early
as March of 1942. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit R). No serious controversy appears to have arisen as operations were conducted
under this memorandum. It is apparent that the parties to
the purchase of the property were not in controversy on the
1st day of March, 1944, for on that day, an instrument entitled Farm Lease (Defendants' Exhibit 2) was entered into.
]. Lloyd Mathis, Nellie M. Mathis and C. E. Kingston, as
trustee in trust for Davis (ounty Co~op are designated as
lessors. J. Lloyd Mathis, Nellie M. Mathis, C.· H. Owens,
Delsa E. Owens, F. L. Hansen, Julia C. Hansen, C. E. Kingston and Allen M. Frandsen, and LaMonda H. Frandsen, his
wife, are designated as lessees. The land is described, and
the lease is for a period of five years beginning March 1, 1944.
4
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The consideration is n$1.00 and other lawful consideration,
plus 50 per cent of profits of each year's ·earnings after all
expenses, loans, etc., are paid." It is definite and certain that
the lessees named took possession of the property at that time,
for on the 24th day of ~lay, 1944, they executed and delivered
to the Utah Farm Production Credit Association, a crop and
chattel mortgage, upon crops grown upon the lands and including a large amount of farm machinery, equipment and a
large number of livestock to secure payment of the sum of
$19,054.95. (See Defendants' Exhibit 9).
On the 19th day of February, 1946, C. H. Owens and
wife, F. L. Hansen and wife, and J. Lloyd Mathis and wife,
executed and delivered to the State Bank of Lehi a crop and
chattel mortgage covering crops grown upon the same land
and also farm machinery, equipment, and livestock and including 2500 bushels of wheat and 1500 bushels of barley
stored in bins on the farm, to secure payment of a l?an of
$8500.00.
We call ·special attention to the farm lease and the two
chattel mortgages· because it will appear hereafter that the
controversies as between the plaintiffs and the Davis County
Cooperaitve Society spring directly from the occupation and
use of the premises during the period following the farm
lease, (Exhibit 2) and indirectly involve the contract between
the plaintiffs and the defendants Ferrells (Exhibit C).
We leave for the time being the statement of the facts
leading up to the controversy as between the plaintiffs and
the Davis County Cooperative Society to take up the statement
chronolo.gically of the facts out of which the controversy be5
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tween the plaintiffs and the defendants Madsens and the
Ferrells arose. To complete the setting, this preliminary observation ·is important.
About 1945, C. E. Kingston, who was then an officer
of the Davis County Co-op, ent~red the employment of C. Ed
Lewis, as a real estate salesman and while he was so employed, the land described in the original contract of purchase by the plaintiffs and Kingston was listed for sale by
the plaintiffs, J. Lloyd Mathis and Nellie M. Mathis and C. E.
Kingston, and in connection with the listing of the property,
Mathis agreed to pay a real estate commission of five per
cent. After the listing, C. Ed. Lewis_ Company made a preliminary Contract of Sale of the real estate· to J. A. Ferrell
for the sum of $140,000.00 signed by J. L. Mathis and C. E.
Kingston as sellers (Plaintiffs Exhibit F).
On December 10, 1946, Ferrells paid $2,000.00 on account of the purchase of the property, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit W)
and on the same day, Ferrell paid the sum of $12,000.00.
The terms of sale were apparently modified and this preliminary contract was signed by J. A. Ferrell, Jay Ferrell, Almira
Ferrell, J. Lloyd Mathis, Nelie M. Mathis and C. E. Kingston
(Exhibit G) .
On the 13th day of January, 1947, a formal agreen1ent was
made between J. Lloyd Mathis and Nellie M. Mathis, as sellers,
and J. A. Ferrell and Almira Ferrel, his wife, and Jay Ferrell,
the son, for the sale of ·the land for $120,000.00, $30,000.00 of which was acknowledged as paid io the contract
and installments of $7,500.00 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit C). It is
made to appear from the record that all of the parties to the
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contract knew of the interest of the Davis County Cooperative
Society in the property, for there \Vas written into the contract
the following provision:
ttln the event there are any liens or encumbrances
against said premises other than those herein provided
for or referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the same by acts or neglect of
the Sellers, then the Buyers may at their option, pay
and discharge the same and receive credit on the
amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount
of any such payment or payments and thereaft~r the
payments herein provided to be made may, at t];le option
of the Buyers, be suspended until such a time as such
suspended payments shall equal any sums advanced as
aforesaid.''
Ferrell paid the first installment of $7,500.00, making
total payments of _$37,500.00 and all of the money went
to Mathis. There is no claim that the Davis County Coopera-·
tive Society received any part of this fund except possibly
an advancement that had been made prior to that time in addi~
tion to the part payable by the Davis Countly Co-op. That was
returned. The Davis County Cooperative demanded a division of the money. Mathis refused to make it, and a sha(p
controversy arose by reason of which Ferrell made no further
payments except under the terms of the stipulation hereinafter
referred to.
On January 23, 1947, while the Ferrell negotiations were
going on, and before the Ferrell contract was acknowledged
and presumably delivered, February 15, 1947, a letter was
addressed to C. Ed .. Lewis, acknowledged but not recorded
7
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(Plaintiffs' Exhibit D). Th~ letter is so ambiguous and we
think meaningless, that its contents cannot be adequately
restated, and certainly we cannot state the legal effect. We,
therefore, incorporat~ it in this statement of the case as
follows:
ttC. E. Lewis Company
117 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

J.

L. Mathis and Nellie M. Mathis, his wife; and
C. E. Kingston and Et4el M. Kingston, his wife, for
the Davis County Cooperative Society, Inc., own on an
B07o-207o basis of Ranch at Lehi, Utah, formerly
know11 as Saratoga or Austin Brothers Ranch; are in
process of liquidation.
When audit is complete final closing of sale of real
estate, livestock, feed, and machinery is sold and
allotment of funds from these; it is hereby agreed
that in event there is not $ufficient funds to pay C. E.
Kingston and Ethel M. Kingston for Davis County
Cooperative Society, Inc., their equity, this property
shall be transferred from Western Underwriters Corporation to]. L. Mathis and Nellie M. Mathsi; secured
by a mortgage at 37o per annum payable to C. E. Kingston and Ethel M. Kingston for Davis County Cooperative Society, Inc., out of all future funds derived
as per sale except of interest due J. L. Mathis and
Nellie M. Mathis until such an amount due C. E.
Kingston and Ethel M. Kingston for Davis County
Cooperative Society, Inc., has been paid in full, hereby
waiv~ng all rights and interests in this property.

Is/ C. E. Kingston
Is/ Ethel M. Kingston
8
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On this . twenty-third day of January, A. D. 1947
·before me personally appeared C. E. l(ingston and
Ethel M. Kingston, his wife who executed and signed
the foregoing document.

Is!
(Seal)
.
My Commission Expires;
August 12, 1949.

Ardous Kingston
Notary Public.''

There is no evidence in the case that C. E. Kingston and/or
Ethel ~I. Kingston, his wife, had any express authority whatsoever to sign this meaningless letter. It was claimed,· however, that they had implied authority to do so, and the court
so found. We call attention again to the fact that at that
time C. E. Kingtson was employed by Lewis. His interests
were adverse to the interests of the Davis County Cooperative
Society. There is no evidence to .the effect that either of the
Ferrells or the defendant Madsen knew of this letter until
after all transactions involving thei:n were closed.
On the 15th day of June, 1948, the Davis County Co-op
executed and delivered to' Alonzo F. Madsen and Leona F.
Madsen, for a valuable consideration, a d_eed to an undivided
one-fifth of the property jointly owned by the plaintiffs and
the Davis County Co-op. The deed was regularly recorded
· and Madsen took possession of one-fifth of the property, which
under agreement, constituted 100 acres, and farmed it, taking .
the crops for 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951. The court has found
that the letter (Exhibit D) operated as a transfer of the undivided one-fifth of the property· to Mathis and that the deed
from the Davis County Co-op to Madsen ·was void.
we now come to the stipulation referred to constantly in
the record. The court will probably .conclude at this stage of

9
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the transactions that the title of the property was involved.
Ferrell had no means of making certain that he could ever
acquire the full ownership of the property or .even that he
could reap· where he had sown. Something had to be done.
Accordingly, all of the parties interested in the property
joined in a stipulation, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit B) under the
terms of which Ferrell was authorized to sell the property,
and out of theproceeds of the sale, to pay to Mathis the sum
of $56,000.00 and to deposit in escrow the balance of what
was determined to be the full purchase price payable by Ferrell
amounting to $37,500.00, which with interest, was subsequently determined to be $39,300.00, in the Clearfield State
Bank, Clearfield, Utah, in the joint names of Dan T. Moyle
and J. D. Skeen, as attorneys of record in this case. The
money is now there on deposit.
In order to clear the title to the property so that it might
be sold, it became and was necessary for Ferrell to procure a
deed from Madsen and wife to the undivided one-fifth as
well as quit claim deeds from other parties to the litigation.
He accordingly agreed to pay M~dsen one-fifth of the selling
price of the property (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12). At this
point, we desire to add that the matter of the Davis County·
Cooperative Society's interest was discussed in correspondence
between Ferrell and Moyle and Moyle, ·attorneys for Mathis.
Ferrells insisted upon the title being cleared because they
knew it was not all in the plaintiff, who had signed the contract before they made payment of the $30,000.00. In order
to satisfy them, on the 25th day of January, 1947, Moyle
and Moyle wrote Ferrell with respect to the title and said:
10
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HI will personally see that a proper conveyance' is
obtained before or at the time the payn1ent is n1ade.''
The Western Reserve Underwriters Corporation refused even
after the stipulation was made to convey the· property to
Mathis because it had agreed to convey to him four-fifths
and to the Davis County Co-op, one-fifth. According! y, it
executed. and delivered deeds-four-fifths to Mathis ~nd onefifth to the Davis County Co-op, which, with the Warranty
Deed from the Davis County Co~op to Madsen, perfec~ed
his title to ·the one-fifth.
Other facts must necessarily be referred to
ment.

i~

our argu-

PENDING LITIGATION, PLEADINGS AND STATUS
On June 30, 1949, Moyle and Moyle, appearing as attorneys for plaintiffs, filed suit in t~e . District Court for Salt
Lake County· against the Davis County Cooperative Society,
Charles W. Kingston, as administrator of the Estate of Charles
S. Kingston, deceased, Charles H. Owens, Francis M~ Hansen
and Allen Frandsen, as defendants, alleging fraud and pr~ying
for an accounting, $50,000.00 general datJ?.ages and $10,000.00
punitive or exemplary damages. That suit is at issue, pre-trial
has ~een had, and specifications of particulars wherein it · is
clairp.ed fraud was perpetrated by the Davis County Cooperative
Society has been filed. It is referred to at length in the tran- ..
script of the testimony, pages 63 to 72, to which reference
will hereinafter
be made in ·detail. While the. Salt Lake suit
.
was thus pending .and undisposed of, and while the Ferrell
11
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contract was in full force and effect, upon which the plaintiffs
had received for their own use and benefit to the exclusion
of the Davis County Co-op $3 7,500.00, plaintiffs filed this
case in the District Court for Utah County, Dan T. Moyle
of the firm of Moyle and Moyle appearing as attorney fqr
the plaintiffs, praying for judgment quieting title to the real
estate in the plaintiffs.
The defendants all filed Answers, Counter-Claims and
Cross-Complaints. The issues thus framed were therefore
limited to the question of the ownership of the land.· It was
in that situation that the Stipulation, appearing on page 75
of the record, was entered into, a pre-trial was had, and the
court made an order sta~ing the issues appearing in the record
on page 84. The contract of purchase of the ranch was offered and received in evidence as Exhibit A with the supplemental agreement providing for the conveyance to Davis County
Co-op of an undivided one-fifth and to the plaintiffs, an undivided four~fifths~ It was agreed that the seller, Western
Reserve Underwriters Corporation, had been paid in full.
The stipulation was received in evidence, the depositing of
money. in escrow was admitted. The Western Reserve Underwriters Corporation conveyed the property - four-fifths to
·plaintiffs apd one-fifth to Davis County Cooperative Society
and the deeds were recorded. It was stipulated that after the
contract of purchase of the property was made, it was operated
under .some arrangement. between the plaintiffs, C. E. Kingston and Ethel M. Kingston. The letter addressed to E. Ed.
Lewis (Exhibit D) was received in evidence subject to proof
of authority to execute it and subject to its interpretation. The
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

deeds to Madsen and wife were admitted, and it was admitted
that Madsen and Ferrell were brothers-in-law and that Madsen
attended an i~rigation meeting, and further, that the total sum
of $39,300.00 \vas deposited in escrow. The following issues
\\·ere reserved for submission to the court:

PRE-TRIAL ISSUES OF FACT

( 1) The arrangement under which the plaintiffs and C. E.
Kingston and Ethel M. Kingston operated the farm prior· to
January 23, 1947.

( 2) The authority of C. E. Kingston for such operation
and the execution of plaintiffs' Exhibit. D.
(3) As to whether ·there was an estoppel which would
operate as confirmation of the authority of Kingston.

( 4) On what date, plaintiffs r.eceived actual notice of the
execution and delivery of the deed (Exhibit 4) .

( 5) As to the actual knowle4ge of Madsen and wife of
Exhibit D.
( 6) As to whether there was a conspiracy between Madsens and Ferrells to defeat plaintiffs' rights.

(7) If Ferrells were entitled t9 specific performance ·of
Exhibit C and plaintiffs· are unable to convey one-fifth of the
property, what damages would be sustained by Ferrells?

(8) Was the deed from Davis County Co-op to Madsens
fraudulently executed?

13
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(9) Did plaintiffs have knowledge of, or give their consent to the assertion by the Madsens of a claim of title by
Madsens of one-fifth of the property?
( 10) Did Ferrels purchase Madsens' interest of onefifth of the property, and if so, upon what terms?
( 11) Did Ferrells, after the assertion of claim by Madsen,

permit defendants to use 100 acres of the land during 1948,
1949, 1950 and 1951, and if so, the value of the use.
Questions of law were reserved as to the effect of plaintiffs' Exhibit D.

( 1) As to notice to Madsens· of Exhibit D or knowledge
of facts sufficient to put them on notice.

(2) If there was conspiracy between Madsens and Fer·
rells, the effect of it upon any claims for damages asserted by
defendant Ferrell.
( 3) If it were determined that the defendants Madsen
acquired good title to the one-fifth interest did defendants
Ferrell waive any right to strict performance by plaintiff of
Exhibit C.
( 4) Are defendants Ferrell entitled to the specific performance of Exhibit C, and are they entitled to damages for .
loss of use of one-fifth interest?
( 5) Did plaintiffs have legal right to make contract of
sale to Ferrell (Exhibit C) ?
( 6) What is the basis upon _which the escrow money
should be paid?
14
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( 7) If Ferrells purchased the one-fifth from Madsen,
were they justified in so doing?

( 8) If they are entitled to reimbursement for the cost.
of one-fifth, are they entitled to offset such amount against
the sale to Mathis ?
( 9) Assuming that in order to relieve the claim of defendants Madsen to title and possession of one-fifth of the
property, were Ferrells justified~ as· a matter of law, in permitting Madsen to use 100 acres of the land?
( 10) The interest of the parties in the money placed in

escrow in the Clearfield State Bank.

STATEMENT OF FINDINGS
1. The court found (Finding No. 5) that after the execu-

tion of the cont!act of purchase of the property, the plaintiff ·
((turned full management of all of the property covered thereby over to C. E. Kingston, as trustee in trust, and that the
said C. E. Kingston, together with other members of the
Society, were in possession of the property until proceedings
for the sale of the property and liquidation of the same, and
the settlement of the accounts and advance between plaintiff
and the Society were had in the latter part of 1946, or the
forepart of 1947." Defendants except to that finding and
assert that it is contrary to all of the evidence, written and
documentary.
2. The court found (Finding No. 7) the stgntng and
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delivery to C. Ed Lewis, a real estate agent, of the letter, Exhibit D.
3. The court found (Finding No. 8) that C. E. Kingston c•did considerable work for Lewis and that Exhibit D
was executed in the office of C. Ed. Lewis after the plaintiff,
J. Lloyd Mathis, had dictated its terms by telephone to the
said C. E. Kingston himself and that such instrument was
signed and acknowledged upon its date.
4. The court finds (Finding No. 10) that the interest of
the Davis County Co-op in and to the real property covered
by the contract (Exhibit 8) was by Exhibit D .. transferred
and conveyed to the plaintiffs upon the conditions subsequent
.that any balance that might be found to be due to the Davis
County Cooperative Society, upon completion of the audit
of the transactions by the plaintiffs and the Society and the
said C. E. Kingston be secured by mortgage payable to C. E.
I<:ingston and Ethel M. Kingston, his wife, for said Davis
County Cooperative Society, with interest at 3 per cent."
5. The court found (Finding No. 10) that ((such condition
subsequent has not as yet matured and the audit showing
some disputable items is now before the Third District Court
of Salt Lake County for determination." The court found that
said Exhibit D and the execution thereof by the said C. E.
Kingston was duly and legally, although not expressly by
formal action, authorized by the Board of Directors of Davis
Coupty Cooperative Society, and by the members thereof.
6. The court found. (Finding No. 13) (Tr. 159) that
C. E. Kingston, together with other members of the Davis
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County· Cooperative Society, \Vere in possession of the property from the date of the said Exhibit A and until the proceedings of sale and liquidation at the approxin1ate time of
Exhibit D, and that during all of this time, the entire Board
of the Society \vere fully· advised of the plans, conditions and
proceedings upon and in connection with the property, and
frequently affirmed ~d reaffirmed the powers of the said
C. E. Kingston to act for the Society in connection with the
property and that such powers were never terminated or
modified and that after the execution· of said Exhibit D, a copy
of the sam~ was a part of the files of the said Society and that
all of the acts of C. E. Kingston in the purchase and management of the property were fully approved by the Board and
by the membership of the Society and that said Exhibit D
was considered by such Board anq members to be a transfer
of the interest of the So~iety to plaintiff, and it was so acted
· upon by them."
7. The court found (Finding No. 14·, Tr. 160) that
Ferrells went into possession of the p.roperty and operated it
during the year 1947, and no demand·was _made upon them
until June of 1948. The court found (Finding No. 15) that
the Davis County Cooperative Society ratified and affirmed
and approved the acts of Kingston in connection with Exhibit
D and is estopped ·from denying C. ·E. Kingston had proper
.authority to execute the same.
8. The court found (Finding No. 17) that Madsen had

· actual notice of Exhibit D or knowledge that would put a
prudent man upon inquiry, that he was a brother-in-law of
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]. A. Ferrell and that Madsen was not a purchaser for value
without notice.
9. The court found (Finding No. 20) that Ferrells had
actual notice of the existence of Exhibit D and that they were
not justified in. giving possession of 100 acres of land to
Madsen.
10. The court found that there had been deposited in

the Clearfield State Bank $39,300.00 pursuant to stipulation.
11. Lastly, the court found (Finding No. 23~) that with

respect to the issue raised as to the sort of arrangement under
which plaintiffs and C. E. Kingston and Ethel M. Kingston,
his wife, operate the property prior to January 23, 1947, is
more properly determined and should be determined in the
said accounting action pending in the Third District Court.

STATEMENT OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
_ As Conclusions of Law, the court drew the following:
1. That Exhibit D transferred all of the interest of the

Davis County Co-op in and to the ranch to the plaintiffs
(Tr. 163).
2. That the plaintiffs were the owners of all of the e.quity

and interest in the contract to purchase from the Western Reserve Underwriters and had the full right and authority to
.execute and deliver the contract, Exhibit C, to Ferrell.
3. That plaintiffs are entitled to all of the consideration
for the sale of the property to the defendants, J. A. Ferrell,
18
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Almira Ferrell and Jay Ferrell, under Exhibit A, (Tr. 164)
including the amounts already received by them and the money
on deposit in the Clearfield State Bank in the names of J. D.
Skeen and Dan T. Moyle, to-wit: $39,300.00, with all interest
thereon, subject however to the right of the defendant, Davis
County Cooperative Society to receive from such. escrow funds
such proportion thereof as may be necessary to con1pensate it ·
for its interest in the property as of January 23, 1947. That
may be determined by the District Court for Salt Lake County .
. 4. That Madsen did not acquire any interest or title in
or to the property involved as against the plaintiffs (Tr. 164).

5. That neither the defendants, Ferrells, nor Madsens
nor any other defendants, with the exception of Davis County
Cooperative ·Society, have any claim of any part of the fund,
and lastly, that there should. be expressly reserved from this
case the interpretation of Exhibits R, E and 2.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit E is a memorandum of an .agreement
as to expenses and receipts from operation of the farm by
C. H. Owens.

STATEMENT OF DECREE
The Decree adjudges the $39,300.00 in escrow tn the
Clearfield State Bank in the joint names of J. D. Skeen and
Dan T. Moyle to be the money of the plaintiffs,subject to the
right of the· defendant, Davis County Cooperative Society,
o_f sufficient of such funds to compensate it for its interest
in the property as of January 23, 1947; and adjudges further.
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that the Davis County Cooperative Society be denied any affirmative relief and expressly reserving the interpretation of
Exhibits R. E and 2 as to their barring upon the relationship
betv1een the plaintiffs and the defendants, C. E. Kingston
and Davis County Cooperative Society, in the farming and
other operations of the property.

POINTS UPON WHICH THE APPELLANTS
EXPECT TO RELY
I. Plaintiffs' Exhibit D, being a communication addressed
'to C. Ed. Lewis Company and signed by C. E. Kingston and
Ethel M. Kingston is void because:

(a) It was signed, delivered and acknowledged without
authority from the Davis County Cooperative Society.
(b) C. E. Kingston was the agent of C. Ed. Lewis Company, who in turn was the agent of the plaintiffs, while at
the same time the said Kingston was the trustee for the Davis
County Cooperative Society and was therefore adversely interested and no implied authority can be imputed to him.
(c) The Board of Governors of the Davis County Cooperative Society considered a proposal by C. E. Kingston
respecting the sale of said property to Ferrell during the
negotiations for the sale of said property but failed to authorize
the said C. E. ~ingston to. sell said property, and implied
authority of the said C. E. Kingston, if any, to a\t for said
corporation cannot be found.
(d) Said instrument was at most but an offer and if communicated to plaintiffs, · was not accepted.
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(e) Exhibit D is void under the Statute of Frauds, because it purports to impose upon the plaintiffs an obligation
to pay to· the Davis County Cooperative Society 20 per cent
of the proceeds of the sale of said property, and to give the
said Davis County Cooperative Society a mortgage to secure
payment of said sum and said instrument was not signed by the
parties to be bound thereby, as required by Utah ,Code 33-5-1, 3.
(f) Exhibit D is unintelligible, incomplete, uncertain ·and
ambiguous to the extent that it cannot be intelligently construed or enforced and it without equity.
II. The court wholly misinterpreted and misconstrued
Exhibit D in this that the cour~ takes cchereby waiving all
rights_ and interest in this property'' out of the context and
construes it to mean an absolute, unconditional transfer of
an undivided one-:fifth of the said land contrary to and in
express disregard of the context thereby making it mean that
the property was transferred by the voluntary act of C. E.
Kingston while acting in a dual capacity for adverse interests
without ·consideration.
III. There is no pro~£ of knowledge of the defendant
. Madsen of the existence of Exhibit D when he took title to
one- fifth of the property.
--~

IV. There is no evidence that the Ferrells had any knowledge of Exhibit D until after they had purchased the property .
in reliance upon paragraph No. 9 of their contract, Exhibit C,
and the Moyle letter, Exhibit 8.
V. The court failed to construe or t~ give effect to contracts for the operation of the ranch, Exhibits R, E and 2.
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\

VI. Exhibit D was not a transfer of the interests of the
Davis County Cooperative Society in the lands covered by
the Contract, Exhibit A.
VII. The plaintiffs refused to pay to the Davis County
Cooperative Society one-fifth of the proceeds of the sale of
said property to Ferrell and thereby rejected the binding effect,
if any, of Exhibit D.
VIII. The trial of this case was abortive and incomplete
and inconclusive in that while the court based its judgment
upon the possession by the Davis County Co-op of the Saratoga
Ranch, it refused to consider the instruments which show conclusively that the legal and actual possession of the property
was in the plaintiff and .other individuals, not including the
Davis County Co-op.
IX. The decree made and given in. the above-entitled
cause is not supported by the findings or conclusions or the
record, is unjust and contrary to law and equity, and the judgment must be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I

POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT D, BEING A COMMUNICATION ADDRESSED TO C. ED. LEWIS AND SIGNED
BY· C. E. KINGSTON AND ·ETHEL M. KINGSTON IS
VOID BECAUSE:
22
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(A)
IT WAS .SIGNED, DELIVERED AND ACKNOWL·
EDGED WITHOUT AUTHORiTY FROM THE DAVIS
COUNTY COOPERATIVE SOCIETY.
The court does not find, in the written opinion or in the
findings, that direct authority was ever given by the Board of
~1anagers of the defendant, Davis County Cooperative Society,
to C. E. Kingston to sell the undivided one-fifth of the Sara. toga Ranch at any time or for any price. The' minutes of the
Board, Exhibit V, negative any claim of such authority.

(B)
C. E. KINGSTON WAS THE AGENT OF C. ED.
LEWIS COMPANY, WHO WAS IN TURN. THE AGENT
OF THE PLAINTIFFS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME,
THE SAID KINGSTON WAS THE TRUSTEE OF THE
DAVIS COUNTY COOPERATIVE SOCIETY AND WAS
THEREFORE ADVERSELY INTERESTED AND NO IMPLIED AUTHORITY COULD BE IMPUTED TO HIM .
.Kingston was dead at the time_ of the trial of the case
and hence his reason for_ signing ~xhibit D could not be dis-·. .
closed to the court however, his acts were readily understandable. He was employed by Lewis as a real estate sales- .
man (Tr. 198) and the court so found. Lewis was a real estate
broker and had this land listed with him for sale on a real
estate dealer's commission (See Plaintiffs' Exhibits F, W and
G). We assume the. employment was on a commission basis;
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however, in any event, it was Kingston's duty to Lewis to
make the sale or to participate in the consummation of it. In
either event, his relations to Lewis and to the Davis County
Co-Op were adverse, and being so adverse, there_ could be
no implied authority to act for the corporation.
Elggren et al vs. Woolley, 64 Utah 183.
In this case, quoting from Thompson on Corporations,
the Court said:
((In all contracts they make they repr~sent the stockholders and not themselves; and in all their official
actions they are to consider, not their private interests,
but that of the stockholders, whose property they manage and control. This rule is so strict and so rigidly_
enforced that the law will not permit. these officials
to subject themselves to any temptations to serve their
own interest in preference to the interest of the stockholders."
In Kahn vs. Perry Zolezzi, Inc., 226 Pac. 2nd 118, Judge
Dunford, speaking for this court said:
c_clt. is against public policy for officers of a corporation to deal with others in relation to corporate business for their own separate advantage and the law
affords no sanction whatever for such acts."
Citing Elggren vs. Woolley.
And see the recent case of
I<nox et al v. First Security Bank of Utah, eta al,
196 Fed. 2nd 112,
wher_e the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,
Bratton, Circuit Judge, speaking for the court said:
c_<A. C. _Milner was interested in having that obliga24
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tio~ on his part discharged by the Milner Corporation

adopting the contract of March 16, 1909. His interests
were adverse to the Milner Corporation, and that being so, he could not bind the corporation· under his
general authority as president. See Fletcher Corporations, Permanent Ed., Vol. 3, Section 922 et seq.; Kahn
v. Perry Zolezzi, Utah 226 P. 2d 118, 123; Elggren
vs. Woolley, 64 Utah 183, 228 P. 906."
The adverse interest having been shown by the plaintiffs .
in this case, we conclude, under these authorities, that there
could be n~ implied authority on the part of Kingston to sign
Exhibit D.

(C)
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE DAVIS
COUNTY. COOPERATIVE SOCIETY CONSIDERED-,.. A
PROPOSAL BY C. E. KINGSTON RESPECTING THE
SALE OF SAID PROPERTY TO FERRELL DURING THE
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SALE OF SAID PROPERTY
BUT FAILED TO AUTHORIZE THE SAID C. E. KINGSTON TO SELL SAID PROPERTY, AND IMPLIED AUTHORITY OF THE SAID C. E. KINGSTON, IF ANY, TO
ACT FOR SAID CORPORATiON CANNOT BE FOUND.
We call attention to the minutes of the Board of Governors
held on November 24, 1946, wherein the matter of selling the
farm was reported by C-. E. Kingston and discussed by the
individual members. C. E. Kingston was not only not authorized to make the sale but the expression of individual members
were against a sale. The price at which Kingston said he had
a chance to sell the property was $140,000.00, not $120,000.00,
...
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for which the place was sold. ·~gain, at the meeting of De-·
cember 22, 1946, Owen reported that Ferrell had said he
was going to buy the· property. Again, rio authority \vas given
l(ingston to make the sale.
Exhibit D is dated January 23,, 1947, and no meeting
was held at which any auth?rity was given between .that date
and the date of signing the Exhibit on January 23, 1947.
It is significatft that at these meetings, there appears to
be no controversy whatsoever between Mathis and the Co-op·
and certainly there was no thought on the part of the Governit?-g Board that Mathis claimed he had been defrauded
or even that there was any indebtedness due from the Co-Op
to him. On the contrary, it' appears that the Co-Op had faithfully complied with its agreement and was able to pay the
balance of. the purchase price of the property without assistane from Mathis. These minutes, we contend, negative any
inte~tion on the part of the Co-Op to permit C. ~· Kingston
to sell the property without action on the part of the Co-Op
· .itself.

(D)
EXHIBIT ·D CONSTITUTED AN UNACCEPTED
OFFER, DID NOT BECOME A CONTRACT AND IS NOT
SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
This exhibit is a letter addressed to . Ed. Lewis, not to
the plaintiffs. It did not purport to be a contract of sale of
the interest of the Davis County Co-Op in the ranch. It imposed obligations upon Mathis and necessitated his accept-
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ance ~ \Yriting which \vas not given. Notwithstanding the last
clause, it did not operate as a sale of the interest of the
Co-Op in the property. The conduct of Mathis shows conclusively that he did not intend to be bound by it, for it provides,
if it can be -construed at all,. for the payment of all of the proceeds of the sale of the property to the Co-Op until its claims
to an undivided one-fifth was elin1inated. That, Mathis refused
to comply with. Furthermore, it provides for the giving by
Mathis of a mortgage to secure payment to the Co-Op of any
balance due it and the mortgage presumably was to cover
the very property that was being sold by Mathis. There is
nothing in the contract of sale to Ferrells that authorized the
giving of such a mortgage. Attention has been called to the
fact that nowhere in the dealings between the Co-Op and
Mathis was. there any indication of an indebtedness from the
Co-Op to Mathis. On the contrary, the evidence shows. there
was none. Had Mathis signed· the instrument, the court coilld
and should have impounded the money or directed the payment of it to the Co-Op, provided Exhibit D constituted such
an instrument as could be specifically enforced, but Mathis
did not elect to be bound by it and it did not become a contract.

(E)
EXHIBIT D IS VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS, UTAH CODE 33-5-1, 33-5-3.
This statute reads:
((No ·estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust
or power ·over or concerning real property or in any
27
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n:anner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, asstgned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writ~ng subscribed. by the party creating, granting, assigntng, surrendenng or declaring the sa1ne, or by his la\vful agent thereunto authorized by' writing."
33-5-3
C!Every contract for the leasing for. a longer period
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party by ·whom the lease or sale
is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing."
.Exhibit D imposes the distinct obligation upon Mathis to. give
a mortgage for an unknown amount upon property which
must be read into the contract and which will attach to all
future funds derived from the sale of the property until the
unknown amount is paid to the Davis County Co-Op. There is
no controversy respecting these propositions.
Construed. in Adams vs. Manning, 46 Utah 82
The Supreme Court of the U~ited States said, in the. very ol~
case of
Hughe·s c. Moore, 3 L. Ed. U.S.R., at page 312,
((The court can perceive of no distinction between
the sale of land, to which a man has only an equitable
title and a sale of land to which he has title. They
are equally· within the statute."
In 49 American Jurisprudence, Section 354, the law ts
stated . as follows:
28
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(]t is not sufficient that the note or n1emorandum
express the terms of a contract; it is essential that it
completely evidence the contract which the parties
made by giving all of the essential terms. The writing
must be such that all of the contract can be collected
therefrom; resort cannot be had ·to the terms of the
oral contract to supply defi.iciencies in the memorandum.
A memorandum which refers to an essential term of
the contract t:ts one to be agreed on subsequently does
not meet the requiren1ents of the statute. A contract
in writing which leaves some essential term thereof to
be shown by parol is only a parol ·contract, and is,
therefore, not enforceable under the statute of frauds. ·
Thus, a written contract for the sale of land or an interest therein must coyer the entire contract in order
to satisfy -the statute."
It is amply supported by the cases cited.
In Williams
court said:

v~

Morris, 95 U. S. 444, 24 L. Ed., 360, the

((Unless the essential terms of the _sale can be ascertained from the writing itself,· or by reference in it
to something else, the writing is not a compliance
with the statute; and, if the agreement be thus defec-tive, it ·cannot be supplied by parol proof, for that
would at once introduce all the mischiefs which the
statute was intended to prevent.''

And in Keystone Hardware Corp. vs. Tague, 158 NE 27, 53
ALR 610, the Court of Appeals of New York said:
((A written contract for purchase and sale of real
estate which provides for mortgage to -expire on dates
to b~ subsequently agreed upon cannot be specifically
enforced if the dates are never agreed upon or are
agreed upon by parol."
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.

·See also Dineen v. Sullivan, 23,1 Pac. 2nd 241, _where the rule
above stated is repeated with quotations from numerous cases.
The letter cannot therefore be treated as a contract for
any purpose whatsoever because it does not purport to be. a
binding contract. It is· vague and uncertain in the respects
pointed out. It is not signed by the Western Underwriters Corporation, which by its terms was to convey the legal title to
the whole of the. property to Mathis contrary to its previous
agreement,· and it is not signed by Mathis and his wife, who
are parties to be bound by it in that they agreed to give Kingston a mortgage · to secure his equity. The ex~ibit tnust ·be·
wholly disregarded.

(F)
EXHIBIT D IS UNINTELLIGIBLE, INCOMPLETE,
UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS TO THE EXTENT
THAT IT CANNOT BE CONSTRUED OR SPECIFICALLY
ENFORCED IN EQUITY.
The plaintiffs, by their conduct, rejected the letter as a
contract or an offer to contract, by taking and holding all of
the money paid by Ferrell, and even after the stipulation was
made, insisted upon the payment in full of their part and the
depositing in e~crow of the part which properly belonged to
the Co-Op or its successors in interest. No mortgage was
tendered. There is no evidence that they participated in securing an audit if any audit was. necessary, but on the contrary,
asserted spurious claims in order to create the color of right
to. take and hold money on accounts which it had never claimed
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to e~ist before Exhibit D '"as signed. It brought suit first against
the Co-Op and various individuals and later, brought suit
to quiet title to the property as hereinafter more fully set out,
in disregard of its contractual obligations. It could scarcely
have done more to make definite and certain its rejection of
the offer if it can be construed as anything of a legal nature.
For the many reasons stated, the letter does not come within
the classes subject to specific performance.
We cite 5th Pomeroy, Section 2188
((But parol evidence con never be given to supply
an omitted item or make definite and certain that which
the parties left indefinite and uncertain; in a word,
parol evidence cannot show the intent of the parties if
it cannot be found in the contract.''
Section 2189
((The contract must be complete, definite and certain
as to whatever conditions are annexed, terms of credit
where given, place of performance, time of performance unless a reasonable time is inferred, and other
terms that are made by the contract. Thus, a contract
to· furnish a city with light, .allowing the ·substitution
of electric light for gas, but leaving the number and
price of the electric lights for later agreement is unenforceable for incompleteness in a material term."
Exhibit D was not mutually enforceable when it was
delivered to Lewis by Kingston, and there never became mutuality in the remedy because the plaintiffs did not sign it or
otherwise accept it as an offer, did not, by their pleading, offer
to do equity, and the plaintiff Mathis, on the witness stand,
positively refused to do equity by paying to the Co-Op its
proportion of the proceeds of the sale of the property. It does
31
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not therefore come within the rule that even though a contract
lacks mutuality when executed, it may be specifically enforced
if there is mutuality in the remedy.
See monographic not to
Vanzandt vs. Heilman, New Mexico, 22 ALR 2nd
497, 508.
After a very extended citation of cases, the rule is stated as
follows:
CGiven a contract within the class \vhich a court of
equity will compel to be specifically executed, and
given the fact that the plaintiff's undertaking remains
wholly or partly executory, the court will not entertain
jurisdiction of the case unless its decree can be made
to compel execution by both sides, and unless it is prepared to retain jurisdiction of the case and oversight
of performance until full execution is accomplished.
The plaintiff must allege that he is ready, able, and
willing to perform his undertaking as may be decreed
by the court, and if on motion or otherwise it appears
that he may not be financially able to do so when
the decree is entered, it is within the discretion of
the court to require such security against that event
as the case may warrant, by payment of money into
court or otherwise."
·
c

Exhibit D in no sense comes within this rule and furthermore
the court did not even attempt to protect the Co-Op, but on
the contrary went to an extreme limit in attempting to stay
the hands of the District Court for Salt Lake County with a
res judicata so that even it could not protect the defendant because of the finding of possession which we have heretofore
criticized.
32
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It cannot be claimed that the suit to quiet title to the
land can be treated as a suit for specific performance and as
an acceptance of an offer by Exhibit D, for the Co~Op withdrew the offer before acceptance upon the refusal of Mathis
. to pay in accordance with Exhibit D and to convey the property to Madsen.

POINT II
THE COURT MISINTERPRETED AND MISCONSTRUED EXHIBIT D.
The exhibit plainly provides that an audit is to be made,
that the funds are to go to C. E. Kingston for the Davis
Co1,1nty Co-Op from the sale of various things, that the property shall be transferred from Western Reserve Underwriters
Corporation to J. L.. Mathis and Nelli~ Mathis, and that the
Co-Op shall have all of the money derived from the sales except interest and the balance due the Co-Op shall be secured
by mortgage until the.Co-Op is paid in full. At that time, there
was in existence a contract with the W esetrn Reserve Underwriters Corporation under which it agreed to convey one-fifth
of_the property to the Co~Op. It was of course not a party
to Exhibit D and was in no way bound by it. When all these
things were done, and the Co-Op had received its money, the
last clause, {(hereby waiving all rights and interest in the
property," could take effect. The instrument is not subject to
any other interpretation. By the Findings, Conclusions and
Decree in this case, the court has, in effect, stricken . out all
parts of Exhibit D excepting only the last clause and has
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attetnpted to tie the hands of the District Court for Salt Lake
County with a res judicata while at the same time refusing
to consider documents showing conclusively that the Co-Op
was not and is not in any way indebted to the plaintiffs.
We invite the court's attention· to the cross examination of
Mathis with respect to Exhibit D, and the retention by him
of all of the money received from the. sale of the property,
and to his detailed specification of claims filed in the District
Court for Salt Lake County. Mr. Mathis was asked (Tr. 61)

"Q. In other words,_ Mr. Mathis, did you think by this
letter, you got this property before the Co-op was
paid up for its one-fifth interest?
A. No, sir.

Q. You didn't?
A. No, sir.

Q. · And you don't claim now that you have this property, do you ?

A. No, sit.
Q. No. You didn't claim that you owned this property
when you made a contract to sell it to Ferrell, did
you?
A. Yes, sir, on the basis of that agreement."
The court found to the contrary and upon the basis apparently
of the finding that the Co-Op had been in ·ppssession of the
property at all times without regard to Exhibits 2, R and E,
which the court refused to consider, and upon the specifications of claims against the Co-Op set out in 33 different assignments in all and specifically referred to in. the record. Be-
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cause of the importance of this claim, \Ye are calling specific
attention to these assignments (Tr. 62-specifically Tr. 68
to 97).
The 33 assignments are epitomized:
1. Reasonable value of meats," poultry, eggs and produce

raised or grown on said property and consumed by the defendants during their occupancy of the same.
2. Charges made by the defendants for repairs and main-

tenance.
3. Charges and expenditures made by the defendants for
gasoline and oil claimed to have been used by them for farming and other equipment.
4. Charges and expenditures made by defendants for repairs to equipment.
5. Charges by defendant Owen for mowing hay.

6. Charges made by Allen Frandsen for plowing in 1945.
7. Charges made by defendant

Hansen

for . hauling

cement.
8. In accordance· with agreements between defendant's

Owen, Hansen and Frandsen and C. E. Kingston, acting· for
or on behalf of defendant, Davis County Co-Op, no charges
for labor performed on the property by these defendants or
their families was to be mad~ against the plaintiffs. In the
items of labor charged by these defendants, an accounting
should be made.
9. The same with respect to thinning beets, etc.
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10. During the years 1945 and 1946, defendants Owe~

and Frandsen, ~n behlf of defendant, Davis County Cooperative Society, · without authorization by or consultation with
plaintiffs, entered into contracts with certain Japanese for the
planting, caring for and harvesting of celery and the advancement of money to them. On this item, we call the court's attention to the chattel and crop mortgage given by the plaintiffs
and others to the State Bank of Lehi (Exhibit 1). The mortgage was signed by the plaintiffs and covered the celery referred to in specification 10.
11. No. 11 is· confined entirely to Owen, Hansen and

Frandsen.
12. No. 12 is confinecl to Owen.

13. No. 13 is for a credit for reasonable value of materials and crops :wasted and all?wed to ·spoil.
14. No. 14 pertains to Owen ..
15. No. 15 pertains to a hay bailer purchased by defendant
Hansen.

16. No. 16 pertains to fertilizer for celery and pertains
to Owen.
17. No. 17 pertains to Owen.
18. No. 18 is for telephone bill and pertains to Owen.

19. No. 19 pertains to Frandsen and is for ch~cks taken
20. No. 20 pertains to flour used by Frandsen.
21. ·No. 21 pertains to.·Owen, Hansen and Frandsen.
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22. No. 22 pertains to tools alleged to have been on the

place at the time of the purchase.
No. 23 pertains to the cost of the cellar constructed for
potatoes without plaintiffs' consent.
24. No. 2-l pertains to charges made against Owen, Han-

sen and Frandsen.
25. No. 25 pertains to charges made against Owen.
26. No. 26 pertains to charges made against Hansen.
27. No. 27 pertains to charges against Frandsen for re-

modeling granary.
28. No. 28 pertains to Owen, to a loss of onion crop.

29. No. 29 is a charge against Frandsen and the Co-Op
for apparently excessive water used in 1945.
30. No. 30 pertains to Frandsen and the Co-Op for the

balance of $90.00 for pasture rental.
31. No. 31 is against. Owen and Frandsen and the Co-Op

for hay raised in 1945 ..
32. No. 32 is against Owen, Hansen and Frandsen and

the Co-Op for equipment taken by them from the property
·
prior to auction sales.
3,3. No. 33 is against all of the defendants for $480.00

for the cost of a temporary electric fence used on the property.
The court will readily see that the charges are substantially all baseq upon the Lease, Exhibit 2, .and are against individuals and not the Co-Op. Notwithstanding which, the
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court, we again say, disregarded Exhibit 2 and in the face of
the fact that the claims are not made against the Co-Op treats
them as a payment to the Co-Op of the moneys due it for its
one-fifth interest. The court goes further and makes the finding,
to
draws the conclusion and enters
the judgment calculated
.
.
bar a full hearing of the pending suit in Salt Lake County.

POINT III
THERE IS NO PROOF IN THE RECORD OF KNOWL~
EDGE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT MADSEN
OR OF THE DEFENDANT FERRELL OF EXHIBIT D AT
THE TIME MADSEN PURCHASED THE ONE-FIFTH INTEREST FROM THE DAVIS COUNTY CO-OP.
The court finds that Madsen had knowledge of Exhibit
D at the time he purchased the property. The finding is based
upon two facts as we understand the record:
1. That Madsen .attended an irrigation meeting prior to

the time he purchased the one-fifth interest from the Co-Op, and
2. That he is the brother-in-law of Ferrell and that Fer-

rell inust have known of the existence of Exhibit D and must
have told Madsen. Madsen testified without contradiction that
he had never ·seen the instrument until it was shown to him
in the office of the writer of this brief in. the preparation of
. the trial of the case in Provo. That evidence is not contradicted.
While this finding is not supported by the evidence and
is wholly unjustified. we pass it with hte suggestion that it
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is wholly immaterial for the reasons whjch we have heretofore
fully set out. No layman or lawyer can read Exhibit D and
conclude that it creates a lien upon anything or operates as
a transfer of anything. It was not known to eithet Madsen
or Ferrell or to their attorney until some considerable time
after Madsen had bought and paid for this property. We will
not repeat all the reasons why the Co-Op was perfectly justified in selling the property to Madsen. It had permitted one
season to go, no doubt hoping to get. a settlement with Madsen, and it was called upon to act or lose its property. The
title to Madsen is perfectly regular in all respects, is for a
valuable consideration. There is _nothing in the record which
discloses any adverse interest, and with the contract (Exhibit
C) before him, Madsen was perfectly Justified in buying the
property as was the Mill Fork Coal Company in taking a
mortgage.

POINT IV
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE FERRELLSHAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF EXHIBIT D UNTIL AFTER
THEY HAD PURCHASED THE PROPERTY IN RELIANCE
UPON PARAGRAPH NO. 9 OF THEIR. CONTRACT
'
EXHIBIT C,. AND THE MOYLE LETTER, EXHIBIT 8.
By the contract, Exhibit C, paragraph ·9, the plaintiffs
agreed that:
(]n the event there are any .liens or encumbrances
against said premises other than those herein provided
for or referred to, or in the event any liens or encum3.9
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brances other than herein provided for shall hereafter
accrue against the same by acts or neglect of the Sellers,
then the Buyers may at their option, pay and discharge
the same and receive credit on the amount then retnaining due hereunder in the amount of any such
payment or payments and thereafter the payments
herein provided to be made may, at the option of the
Buyers, be suspended until such a tin1e as such suspended payments shall equal any sums advanced as
aforesaid."
·
And the Moyle letter is as follows: (Exhibit 8)
((You refer to the fact that Dr. Mathis does not appear of record to be the owner of the property. I have
personally investigated this matter, and find that Dr.
Mathis has a Contract for the purchase of the property and I suggest that the payment of the balance of
the down payment be made only upon condition that
at the time of payment Dr. Mathis receive a proper
deed for the property. I will personally see that a
proper conveyance is obtained before or at at the
time the payment is m:ade."
As above observed there is no evidence whatsoever that
Ferrell, at that time, had knowledge of Exhibit D .. He knew
of the outstanding one-fifth interest in the Co-Op, and that
is the interest ·which Moyles, by their letter, personally guaranteed to procure by legal conveyance before releasing th~
$30,000.00 which he paid for the p~operty. He was dealing
with lawyers of good standing, he trusted them and trusted
Mathis. H~ had a right to do so. Even had he known of the
existence of Exhibit D," he still would have been justified in
paying his money for it was paid upon the express condition
that it should not be turned over to Mathis until a proper conveyance of the property was made. Such a conveyance was
40
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not procured, and hence the trouble. Notice of existence of
Exhibit D is wholly immaterial because Ferrells had protected
themselves as against such contingency, both by the letter
and by the contract. In the confusion resulting from the breech
of good faith, as indicated, the title of the property was hopelessly involved and the stipulation furnished the only way
out. It protects the rights of all parties. Before the Madsen
interest could be eliminated, it was necessary for Ferrell to
make an arrangement with him, which he did, as shown by
the evidence, by agreeing to pay Madsen his proportionate
part of the amount received from the sale of the property to the
Sugar House Stake. The Western Reserve Underwriters Corporation, as previously stated, refused to convey except in
strict accordance with their contract, and the title therefore
went four-fifths to ~athis and one-fifth to the Co-Op, which
by the Warranty Deed to Mathis, passed to him and from
him to Ferrell.
From the sales of the property, $39,300.00 was deposited
rn the Clearfield State Bank- in the joint names of Dan T.
Moyle and J.-D. Skeen. The effect of the decision of the court,
at this time, is to deprive Ferrell of his right to make application of the money, which he received from the property to
the extinguishment of the debt and Madsen's claim to the
one-fifth interest. By the conflicting- findings of the court
and the conclusion that the very instruments which must be
construed to determine rights must be left for construction
to another court. The court has deprived the Co-Op of' its
interest in the fund. It has deprived Ferrell of ·his interest
and Madsen of his interest, regardless ·of the interpretation
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of the Exhibits E, R and 2 and the outcon1e of the suit now
pending in Salt Lake County. Either the court spould have
refused to try this case or it should have completed- the trial
instead of attempting, by one isolated, unsupported and
erroneous finding,. to· tie the hands of another court.

POINT V
TlfE COURT FAILED TO CONSTRUE OR TO GIVE
EFFECT TO CONTRACTS FOR .THE OPERATION OF
THE RANCH, EXHIBITS R, E AND 2.
Exhibits R and E are simply memoranda of some sort
of · a proposed working agreement for the operation· of the
farm. In both agreements, Mathis is an active participant in
the whole of the farm business.
Exhibit 2 is a formal lease, complete in all respects and
the court will find Mathis to be a lessor and a lessee. He actively participated in all ranch business after the date of the
instrument. The Davis Cou~ty Cooperative Society ~as not. a
lessee under the lease. After its execution, application was
rn~de to the Production ·Credit Corporation for a loan of
approximately $19,054.95. The money was received and expended by the lessees under Exhibit 2.
Hansen, Frandsen and Owen were lessees and apparently
lived on the property· and. ~ad to do with the business end
of the operations. Subsequently, the ·same lessees borrowed
$8,500.00 from the Lehi State Bank. The money was put in
the name of Owen and paid out on his checks. Mathis par-
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ticipated in the management of the farm and in the conduct
of its business. The court will find in a chattel and crop mortgage given by the lessees under the lease, Exhibit 2, that there
was included all personal property on the ranch and also all
crops. The celery crop complained of by Mathis was specifically
described in the crop mortgage. A checking of the items specified in the particulars in the Salt Lake County suit in connection with the items included in the Lehi State Bank mortgage wil~ disclose the participation of Mathis and also that
the operations were conducted under the terms of the Lease,
Exhibit 2. If losses were sustained, they were losses charge-.
able to the lessees only and not to the Co-Op. The cross examination of Mathis clearly disclosed that he was not acting
in good faith in wtihholding the money from the .Co-Op ev.en
though Exhibit D were valid, but on the contrary, filed the
suit for the purpose of intimidating the Co-Op, and as a pretense for withholding from it its proportion of the money
paid by Ferrell as the purchase price of the land .

. POINT VI
EXHIBIT D WAS NOT A TRANSFER OF THE INTERESTS OF THE DAVIS COUNTY COOPERATIVE
SOCIETY IN THE LANDS COVERED BY THE CONTRACT, EXHIBIT A.
The court has treated Exhibit D as a valid transfer of the
undivided one-fifth of the Saratoga Ranch to the plaintiffs.
But for the stipulation, which is made without prejudice to
either of the parties, to have accomplished . the purposes of
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the court i~ cutting off the rights of the Co-Op, it would
have been necessary ~qr the court to have .entered a Decree
specifically performing the Contract, Exhibit D. We have set
forth in detail the reasons why this could not have been done
because Exhibit D was not a contract which would lend itself to specific performance. Accordingly, the court has taken
the short cut predicated upon the stipulation which was to be
without prejudice and has adjudged the money (the proceeds
of the sale .of the property) to belong to the plaintiffs. It
has done, indirectly and through the stipulation, what it could
not have done in a direct suit for the specific performance
of the memorandum. The defendants are entitled to protection
under the stipulation.
In order to bring about this result, a whole senes of
errors was committed:
l. The court disregarded the contract for the purchase

of the land, Exhibit A.
2. N othwithstanding the utter insufficiency of Exhibit

D it proceeded to specifically enforce it.
3. The court disregarded the Ferrell contract, Exhibit C.
4. It imputed notice to Madsen because he attended a
11?-eeting of a water company and was a brother-in-law of
Ferrell.
5. It nullified the deed to Madsen.
6. It disregarded the non-acceptance of Exhibit D and
its repudiation by the plaintiffs in withholding all of the
money.
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7. It has treated the instrument, which was not even

intended as a conveyance or transfer of any interest. whatsoever to be a valid deed of conveyance.
8. It disregarded the solemn agreement by the attorneys

for the plaintiffs to procure a legal conveyance to Ferrell and
9. The court has disregarded the solemn stip~lation of
the parties that it was made without prejudice in order to
clear the title to the land that it might be sold.

POINT VII
THE PLAINTIFFS REFUSED TO PAY TO THE
DAVIS COUNTY COOPERATIVE SOCIETY ONE-FIFTH
OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF SAID PROPERTY·
TO FERRELL AND THEREBY REJECTED THE BINDING
EFF~CT, IF ANY, OF EXHIBIT D.
The absolute and persistent .refusals on the part of
Mathias to pay any part of the money received from the sale
of the property to the Co-Op can be construed only as a rejec- ··
.tion of Exhibit D. It makes no difference whether that was a
condition precedent or a condition subsequent. The fact that
the plaintiffs resorted to a subterfuge to cheat the Co-Op out
of its proportion of the money can be treated only as a rejection
and repudiation of Exhibit D. There is no evidence that the
Co-Op, as such, actually participated in the operation of the
farm after Exhibit 2 was signed and the money was borrowed
first frol!l the Production Credit Corporation and later from
the Lehi State Bank. On the contrary, the lessees, borrowing
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the money, complied with the rigid requirements of the Federal
loan in the first instance, both in caring· for and in marketing
the crops and ultimately in repaying the borrowed money,
and it is perfectly evident that they likewise complied with
the terms of the Chattel and Crop 1vfortgage given to the
Lehi State Bank, during the time·. the lessees were borrowers
from it. Such a large loan from a small town bank would
have had rigid attention until it was paid. The fact that the
obligation was met impels the conclusion that the lessees
under Exhibit 2 complied with their obligation. One of the
principal complaints made by Mathias was ·that too much..
celery was planted. Even so, it was Mathias who signed the
crop mortgage which covered the acreage of celery, which
he said was excessive.

POINT VIII
THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE WAS ABORTIVE AND
INCOMPLETE AND INCONCLUSIVE IN THAT WHILE
THE COURT BASED ITS JUDGMENT UPON THE POSSESSION BY THE DAVIS COUNTY . CO-OP OF THE
SARATOGA RANCH, IT REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE ·
INSTRUMENTS WHICH SHOW CONCLUSIVELY THAT
THE LEGAL AND ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY WAS IN THE PLAINTlFF AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS, NOT INCLUDING THEDAVIS COUNTY CO-OP.
The most serious criticism of the findings and conclusions
is that the court went out of its way to cover up a res judicata
which may have the effect of staying the hand of the District
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Court for Salt Lake County in the pending case. We have said
all that \Ye should say with respect to the grievous errors
of the court in finding that the Davis County Cooperative
Society was in charge of the ranching operations in the face
of the conclusive documentary evidence to the contrary. While
the court left the construction of the Exhibits R, E and 2 to
the Salt Lake Court, the construction, regardless of the views
of the Salt Lake Court, may serve no purpose if the finding
and conclusion that the Co-Op was in possession of the property stands. As to whether the finding and conclusion actually
constitute a res judicata would be a legal question and another
lawsuit which we hope to avoid. If this. judgment stands, the
Salt Lake Court may be left the one function of· balancing
the accounts involving the qperation of the farm under Exhibit 2. But the court will have, by this Judgment, given effect
to Exhibit D and will have cut off completely the meritorious
claims of both Madsen and Ferrell and would have jeopardized the position of the Co-Op. In addition to what we have
heretofore said, we call atten~ion to the fact that the Co-Op
is a corporation with stockholders and capital and the individuals named in Exhibit 2 were simply stockholders of the
corporation. ·Without any contention having been made in
the pleadings, the evidence, briefs, arguments or otherwise
that the individuals were acting for the Co-Op and not for
themselves, the court disregards the corporate entity and holds
the corporation liable for obligations, if any; of three of its
stockholders, who acted for themselves and not" otherwise.
It would serve no purpose to pursue this argument further
upon this point.
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POINT IX
THE DECREE MADE 'AND GIVEN IN THE ABOVEENTITLED CAUSE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS OR THE RECORD, IS UNJUST
AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND EQUITY, AND.THE
JUDG~ENT MUST BE REVERSED.
· Under no theory of law or equity can this judgment be
sustained. If not set aside, .extended expensive litigation is
bound to follow because the Utah County Court has invaded
the jurisdiction of the Salt Lake County Court, and without
issues, evidence or reason may have barred the just and equitable disposition of the controversies among the parties hereto.
Respectfully submitted,

J.D. SKEEN,
Attorney for Appellants
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